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Abstract: This paper examines market efficiency surrounding hurricanes in the 
immediate post-landfall period. Using hypotheses derived from distinctions 
between the efficient market hypothesis and the adaptive market hypothesis, it 
runs event studies on a sample of gulf-exposed property and casualty insurers for 
hurricanes that made landfall domestically in the 2004 and 2005 hurricane 
seasons. Testing these post-landfall inefficiency measurements shows that a 
statistically significant window of inefficiency exists immediately following 
hurricane landfall. This confirms the prediction of the adaptive market hypothesis, 
and as a result shows that hurricanes create opportunities for abnormal risk-
adjusted returns in this market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
I. Introduction: 
 
 
 
 Exploiting periods of market inefficiency to generate abnormal risk-
adjusted returns in equity markets is an ever-evolving pursuit of economic 
research. The results of such studies have real-world applications and profit 
potential, yet as quickly as inefficiencies are discovered they often disappear in 
similar fashion as investors exploit the inefficiency and it corrects itself. This fact 
serves as perpetual motivation to find new ways of thinking about market 
efficiency and its drivers, and as of late the scholarly community pondering this 
question has taken particular interest in market responses to crises, both man-
made and natural. 
 The classic method of testing market efficiency is event study, which 
examines abnormal returns of specific equities around an event date and attempts 
to isolate whether or not markets anticipated the event’s implications1. A 
limitation of this methodology as it applies to disasters is the necessary condition 
of knowing when the event will occur, a fact that makes attempts to run event 
study around most types of crises ineffective. 
 Coincidentally, hurricanes are predictable disasters. Modern technology is 
able to track progress towards land and storm severity very accurately, making 
these storms a good fit for event study analysis of market efficiency. Hurricanes, 
especially those in recent memory, are among the most devastating disasters of all 
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 I explain the event study methodology in-depth later.  
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time. The 2005 hurricane season2 alone accounted for over $52 billion in insured 
losses in the United States. This figure is almost 93% of domestic insured losses 
for the entire year (Guidette, 2006). Taking advantage of this predictability, I run 
event study around hurricanes to determine whether the U.S. stock market reacts 
efficiently to hurricanes that make landfall domestically. 
 I now turn to the relevant literature surrounding hurricanes and market 
efficiency in an attempt to understand where the research currently stands. This 
research will serve as a stepping-stone for my study, providing a framework for 
its execution, bringing factors that need to be controlled to attention, and raising 
further questions to test. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: I begin with a review of 
relevant literature and move from this to outline testable hypotheses in the theory 
section. I then, outline the event study methodology in detail, describe the data set 
I will be using, present my results, and make a few concluding remarks. 
 
II. Previous Literature: 
 
 Literature on the topic of market efficiency surrounding hurricanes falls 
into two general categories: those that run event study around hurricanes 
themselves, and those that analyze the time-varying ways in which investors and 
markets adapt in their responses to these storms. Before discussing these studies, 
it is important to step back and review literature that examines the true economic 
impact of hurricanes. 
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 In the days, weeks, and even months following hurricanes, there is 
undeniable economic cost. Infrastructure damage alone disrupts the business 
process of affected areas, but these consequences phase out over time, and it is not 
out of the realm of possibility for an affected area to benefit economically from a 
hurricane long-term. Ewing and Kruse (2002) find that hurricane recovery in the 
high-risk area of Wilmington, North Carolina led to improvements in the 
economy of the area in the long run. Likewise, the unemployment rate in Corpus 
Christi, Texas improved due to the recovery activity of Hurricane Bert3 (Ewing et 
al., 2005). This short- vs. long-term dichotomy in the economic impact of 
hurricanes makes any values of ‘true economic cost’ immediately suspect. 
Lamb (1998) showed negative abnormal returns for property and casualty 
insurers in his event study around Hurricane Andrew4. These abnormal returns 
prove that the market responded inefficiently to Hurricane Andrew (Lamb, 1998). 
His event study differentiates between insurance firms with property and casualty 
exposure in the Gulf of Mexico region and those without exposure, and this 
differentiation allows him to discern that the market accurately differentiated 
these two types of firms. Firms with more exposure suffered greater abnormal 
losses in the post-hurricane period than their less-exposed competitors (Lamb, 
1998).  
Ewing, Hein, and Kruse (2006) take Lamb’s work a step further and run 
their event study with a focus on the days leading up to Hurricane Floyd5 instead 
of focusing solely on the abnormal returns post-landfall. The prices of property 
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 Landfall: August 1999. 
4
 Landfall: August 1992. 
5
 Landfall: September 1999. 
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and casualty insurers fell or rose abnormally based on the changing reports of 
projected landfall date, wind speed, and storm category (Ewing et al., 2006). 
These abnormal returns in the pre-hurricane period that did not exist in the post-
hurricane period show an efficient response to Hurricane Floyd. 
  Recent research has taken the conclusions of these papers that markets 
respond efficiently to hurricanes in varying degrees and looked a step further: on 
the adaptations markets make in their responses to hurricanes. Blau, Ness, and 
Wade (2008) capitalize on the close proximity of the landfalls of two of the most 
notable hurricanes in the last decade, Katrina and Rita6, and examine market 
anticipation and reaction to both. They show that abnormal short volume and 
price drop occurs in the exposed insurance firms three trading days after Katrina’s 
landfall, while this same negative impact was priced into the market before Rita’s 
landfall only 27 days later (Blau et al., 2008). The implication of this result is that 
stock market adapted and responded more efficiently pre-landfall to Hurricane 
Rita than it did to Hurricane Katrina7.  
 The conclusion of the literature demonstrates an interesting point about 
markets, at least in the context of hurricane response efficiency. Within seasons 
investors learn from past inefficiency and modify their behavior to correct that 
inefficiency (Blau et al., 2008). The loose ends left by current research lead to a 
number of questions. I answer two such questions by testing hypotheses outlined 
in the following section. First, given the discrepancy between degrees of efficient 
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 Katrina Landfall: August 2005; Rita Landfall: September 2005. 
7
 It should be noted that while my results echo the finding that the negative impact was priced into 
Hurricane Rita in the pre-landfall period, the abnormal price fluctuations that occur post-landfall 
tell a different story regarding the relative inefficiency generated by each storm. This is illustrated 
in Figures A.9 and A.11. 
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response to individual hurricanes in separate studies, does the market respond to 
hurricanes on an overall basis efficiently? When trying to design a trading 
strategy with abnormal risk-adjusted returns, if these returns can only be shown in 
hindsight on a hurricane-by-hurricane basis they are ineffective in the real world. 
If the market responds to hurricanes on an inefficient basis across all hurricanes, a 
similar trading strategy is profitable looking forward as well. 
 Second, is the observed variability seen in literature that examines pair of 
hurricane efficiency true across all hurricanes? Is this variability simply random, 
and market response to hurricanes on an overall basis is constant? Testing this 
hypothesis has implications as to how quickly the abnormal-risk adjusted returns 
that may exist disappear. 
 With a better understanding of current literature in mind, as well as a 
number of questions to consider, I now turn to theory to create testable hypotheses. 
These hypotheses will determine the data set that is necessary, as well as the 
formal empirical processes that are required to test them. 
 
 
III. Theory 
 
 
 
 
 The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) is the underlying theory for any 
study testing market efficiency. It asserts that efficient markets are ones in which 
prices immediately reflect all available information and moves on to define the 
weak, semi-strong, and strong forms of market efficiency (Fama, 1970). Until 
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recently, this theory on the behavior of capital markets has remained 
unquestioned. As of late, however, an alternative to the EMH, known as the 
adaptive market hypothesis (AMH) has taken hold. The AMH attempts to 
reconcile traditional finance theory with behavioral economics, describing a 
market that adapts and evolves rather than one that is static (Lo, 2004). 
Discrepancies between the EMH and AMH provide a theoretical base of testable 
hypotheses to explore.  
 Both the EMH and AMH state that current market prices reflect all 
fundamental information. The AMH incorporates a period of time during which 
market participants discern what information is fundamentally efficient and what 
information is inefficient noise. This period of inefficiency in the AMH is one of 
its key differences from the EMH: the prediction that abnormal risk-adjusted 
profit opportunities exist in financial markets (Lo, 2004). This distinction 
legitimizes my pursuit of inefficiency, especially in the immediate post-hurricane 
period when investors are most likely to be discerning the difference between 
fundamentally efficient information and inefficient noise: 
 
 Hypothesis 1: 
 The U.S. stock market responds to hurricanes efficiently8. 
 
 An important note about this hypothesis: the definition of efficiency I use 
in this paper is as defined by the EMH. That is, I determine an efficient reaction 
as one in which no abnormal price fluctuations occur after the event date. If this 
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 Efficiency in this case as defined by the EMH. 
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hypothesis holds, the U.S. stock market behaves under the assumptions of the 
EMH in regards to hurricane response. If we are able to reject it and a period of 
inefficiency exists as defined by the AMH, these assumptions hold. In pursuing 
evidence of the brief inefficiency predicted by Lo’s AMH, I tailor my event study 
to an untraditionally small window in the post-hurricane period, an assumption 
that is addressed when I walk through the event study methodology. 
Moving forward, under the EMH investors react to all information as it 
becomes known as though in a vacuum. That is, investor reactions to similar 
information in previous periods have no impact on their reaction to information in 
the current period. In an EMH world, investors are static players who do not 
change their behavior across time periods. Under the AMH, however, investors 
change and adapt their behavior based on their motivation to exploit risk-adjusted 
profits left on the table by the potential inefficiencies of previous periods. Of 
course, the opposite may be the case and it may be investor frustration with the 
inability to generate abnormal risk-adjusted returns that leads them to adapt their 
efficient investment strategy, leading to inefficiency. Whatever the case may be, 
this distinction between the EMH and AMH provides another hypothesis to test: 
 
 Hypothesis 2:  
 
 The U.S. stock market’s degree of efficiency in response to hurricanes is 
constant. 
 
Once again, my ability to reject or accept this hypothesis points to whether 
the assumptions of the EMH or AMH hold truer in the case of variability of 
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market response to hurricanes over time. If degree of efficiency is constant, 
investors exist in an EMH vacuum. If degree of efficiency is variable, AMH 
assumptions hold. 
With a foundation for my question established in the literature and a pair 
of hypotheses to test derived from the EMH and AMH, I now outline the process 
of conducting an event study before moving on to describe my data set. 
 
V. Event Study Methodology 
 
 As previously mentioned, event study is a process used in financial 
academia to assess the impact of an event on the value of a given company’s 
stock. Within this basic use are a variety of applications, including the ability to 
estimate the cumulative abnormal returns due to an event (and the significance of 
this measurement), both for an individual company being tested but also across a 
sample of firms to give a measure of cumulative abnormal returns caused by the 
event itself on the firms. The basic process is as follows, and as each step is 
discussed I note the unique parameters I define to effectively test my hypotheses. 
I first need to estimate normal performance of each of my firms relative to the 
market. Once normal performance is derived I am able to calculate expected 
return and abnormal returns around an event. The summation of these abnormal 
returns gives me a cumulative measure of abnormal returns, which I test for 
significance both at the firm and sample level. If these cumulative abnormal 
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returns are significant in the immediate post-hurricane period, market response to 
the hurricane was inefficient.  
  The purpose of the estimating normal performance is to derive how 
sensitive each of the firms in our data set is to performance of the greater market. 
This sensitivity is known as beta, and flows from the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
as Follows: 
    	  
   
In the above equation, E(Ri) represents the expected return of firm i, which 
is the sum of the risk-free rate, Rf, and firm i’s sensitivity to the market risk 
premium, with βi representing this individual firm sensitivity and (E(Rm) – Rf) 
representing the market risk premium. Stated another way, this sensitivity that 
beta measures is represented as: 

   
, 
  
 Thus, beta is simply a measure of how sensitive the returns of each firm 
are to the returns of the market. Using data from the 2003 hurricane season9, I 
calculate this sensitivity for each firm to market returns using a static estimation 
window, and this beta is used as a measure of normal performance relative to the 
market. 
 This static estimation window deviates from traditional event study. 
Typically, event studies use a lagged estimation window, such as the 10 trading 
days prior to the event window to estimate normal performance. Lagged 
estimation windows are problematic for this study, because often times in the two 
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week window before hurricane landfall another storm is hitting the Gulf. A lagged 
estimation window that covers landfall of a previous hurricane will generate a 
significantly inaccurate beta, and the bias in this beta will impact the calculation 
of expected and abnormal returns. A static estimation window assures that my 
beta is free of bias, and if we assume that individual hurricanes themselves do not 
impact an individual firm’s sensitivity to market returns (this is often a function 
intrinsic company properties, such as leverage and riskiness of capital structure) 
there is no need for a lagged estimation window anyway. 
 With a measure of beta for each of our firms, I am able to move on to 
calculating expected returns and abnormal returns in the event window. Once 
again, the proximity of hurricanes in these seasons prohibits an event window of 
traditional length, leading me to one that measures the cumulative abnormal 
returns from the date a hurricane makes landfall until the end of the 2nd trading 
day following. The reason for this small window traces back to the theory section 
of the paper and discussion of the short window of inefficiency the AMH 
incorporates allowing investors to sort fundamental from inefficient information 
in their investment decision. The only measure of cumulative abnormal return that 
is relevant to my hypotheses will occur shortly after event occurrence, and this 
window satisfies that requirement.  
 Calculating cumulative abnormal returns requires a calculation of 
abnormal returns for each day in the event window: 
      
 
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 Abnormal return for firm i on day t is the return of that firm on day t 
removing the expected return for that day, measured by the beta for firm i from 
our estimation window multiplied by market return on day t.  
 Cumulative abnormal return is calculated from these daily abnormal 
returns, and is simply a summation of abnormal returns over the event window: 
,     

 
 
 The results of the 192 event studies conducted across the 16 firms in the 
sample for all 12 hurricanes can be seen in appendix Tables A.1 to A.12. 
Diagrams of the cumulative abnormal return for each hurricane one week pre- and 
post-landfall can be seen in Figures A.1 to A.12. With a cumulative abnormal 
return measure for each of our firms for each hurricane, I estimate the cumulative 
abnormal return caused by each hurricane across firms by bootstrapping the 
estimation of this measure, a process that draws randomly from the 16 firms to 
provide a more accurate measure of standard error. While this process does not 
impact the coefficient estimates, the standard errors for each estimate converge 
with a large enough number of bootstrap repetitions, and the process allows a 
more accurate calculation of statistical significance.  
 With an understanding of the event study process and the data necessary to 
conduct one, I now describe the data set I use to test my hypotheses. 
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IV. Summary Statistics 
 
  
  
 Several considerations immediately limit the scope of the data set I am 
able to use. For one, market conditions since 2008 and the exposure of insurance 
firms to the financial crisis make the task of isolating abnormal returns to property 
and casualty insurers due to hurricanes in this time frame impossible. 
Additionally, the sparse numbers of hurricanes in many hurricane seasons (with 
none making landfall domestically in some seasons) makes measuring variability 
of response in-season impossible. With these factors in mind, and knowing 
activity in terms of storm frequency in the adjacent 2004 and 2005 hurricane 
seasons was significantly above average, these two hurricane seasons serve as the 
time window I use for analysis. 
 Determining how efficiently markets react to hurricanes requires an ability 
to measure the cumulative abnormal returns that occur after a given hurricane 
makes landfall. Historical closing price data for gulf-exposed property and 
casualty insurers as well as landfall date for all hurricanes over our sample period 
will combine in an event study to give us a measure of inefficiency to use in 
further regressions to test my hypotheses. 
 My data set consists of daily closing price from 2003 through 2005 for the 
11 publicly traded property and casualty insurers used in Lamb’s paper (1998) in 
addition to 5 industry competitors, as well as historical closing price of the S&P 
500 over the same time horizon10. The firms are listed alphabetically in Table 1. 
Information on all hurricanes that made landfall in the 2004 and 2005 hurricane 
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 Historical closing price data comes from Yahoo Finance: http://www.finance.yahoo.com 
 13
seasons is listed in Table 2. With this data, I generate a daily return for each of 
our insurers over this three-year window, which I use to test for significant 
cumulative abnormal return over the period starting on landfall date and ending at 
the end of the second trading day following11. As previously stated, I use the 2003 
hurricane season as my estimation window. The end result of this process is a 
measure of cumulative abnormal return generated by each hurricane across all 
insurers in the sample, a statistic I am able to test for significance using a 
bootstrapped standard error.  
 The measures produced from this methodology represent the cumulative 
abnormal return generated by each hurricane in the post-hurricane period. 
Keeping the true goal of the study in mind, however, necessitates altering this 
variable. The results of the event study will be a collection of positive and 
negative percentage estimates, and while the direction of these cumulative 
abnormal returns may be of interest to future studies, magnitude (not direction) of 
inefficiency is the true measure of efficiency, which is why I square the 
cumulative abnormal return estimates from my event study before testing their 
joint significance. Table 3 shows the characteristics of the cumulative abnormal 
return variable as well as its squared values, generated from the event study 
process. 
 The lack of discussion regarding independent variables is done 
purposefully. While one might ask how this study controls for, perhaps, 
macroeconomic conditions or company-specific structure without independent 
variables, the truth is that all of these factors are controlled for in the event study 
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process. Company specific factors (important because they likely influence the 
degree to which investors react inefficiently) are inherent in the event study 
process because of the estimation window. Normalizing returns to a broad index 
such as the S&P 500 controls for the macro environment. In essence, the study 
controls for more factors than I could list due to the incalculable number of 
variables that influence individual stock betas and the macro environment in 
which they trade. 
 
VI. Empirical Results 
 
A few preliminary observations that do not impact the hypothesis tests I 
conduct but will be expanded on in my concluding remarks are the notable 
overreaction in the positive direction following the landfall of Hurricane Rita12 
(Figure A.11) and the instance of only one true perfectly efficient reaction across 
all 192 event studies. For all practical purposes a number of firms reacted within a 
range that could be considered efficient to a number of hurricanes, and these 
results are not relevant to the central focus of the paper until the degree of 
efficiency of the individual companies in my sample are tested for significance 
jointly, yet I consider them worth noting nonetheless. 
The results of my joint test across property and casualty insurers for the 
efficiency level of the market response to each hurricane can be seen in Table 4. 
The coefficient can be interpreted as the percentage change over landfall date and 
the two trading days following for each storm that is not accounted for by market 
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 Demonstrated by the significant positive overreaction in the post-hurricane period. 
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factors. While these percentages are small, the fact that the combined market 
capitalization of our sample of firms is approximately $300 billion makes even 
small percentages of abnormal returns economically significant.  
In terms of statistical significance, 3 storms have large enough z-scores 
calculated using our bootstrapping method to reject that the true cumulative 
abnormal return caused by the storm is different from zero. The U.S. stock market 
reacted inefficiently in both a statistically significant way to Hurricanes Charley, 
Katrina, and Rita. As touched on before, the inefficient positive cumulative 
abnormal returns generated by Hurricane Rita in the post-hurricane period are an 
interesting point to note, yet as I am about to discuss, not relevant to the central 
focus of this study. 
Negative cumulative abnormal returns in the post-hurricane period 
represent inefficient reactions, as the market underestimated the impact of the 
hurricane in the pre-hurricane period. Positive cumulative abnormal return 
estimates are also inefficient, as they represent overestimates of hurricane impact 
in the pre-hurricane period. While the drivers of these positive and negative 
abnormal reactions in the post-hurricane period may be of interest to future 
studies, they do not aid in testing either of the hypotheses of this study. This 
directional inefficiency is a topic I touch on in my concluding remarks. 
Ultimately, however, direction of inefficiency is irrelevant, magnitude is what 
matters, and for this reason when conducting estimates to test my hypotheses I 
square the cumulative abnormal return coefficients seen in Table 4 to generate a 
measure of overall inefficiency caused by each hurricane.  
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i. Hypothesis 1: 
 
My first testable hypothesis is that markets react efficiently to hurricanes 
as defined by the efficient market hypothesis. As I discussed in my preliminary 
results, three hurricanes in my sample show statistically significant inefficient 
reactions but it remains to be seen whether the reactions of the market to the 
group of hurricanes as a whole are statistically inefficient. I test this hypothesis 
using a bootstrapped estimation of the true value and standard error of overall 
efficiency across hurricanes, a process that once again draws repetitively from the 
sample of cumulative abnormal returns for each hurricane to derive a 
bootstrapped standard error that strengthens my z-test of statistical significance. 
The result of this test can be seen in Table 5. I find that the U.S. stock market 
does not react efficiently to hurricanes on an overall basis.  
The statistically significant estimation of my cross-hurricane efficiency 
coefficient allows me to reject the null hypothesis that the U.S. stock market 
reacts efficiently to hurricanes as defined by the EMH. This rejection 
demonstrates the existence of a brief post-hurricane period of inefficiency as 
predicted by the AMH, and I accept the alternate hypothesis that markets react 
inefficiently to hurricanes and the AMH assumptions hold when examining 
market behavior in response to hurricanes. 
While the estimate in Table 5 shows a positive cumulative abnormal 
return, the interpretation is inherently different than the interpretation of the 
estimates in Table 4. In testing this efficiency hypothesis, direction of inefficiency 
was irrelevant and removed. Thus, our prediction in Table 5 does not imply that 
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the market will react inefficiently in a positive direction in the post-hurricane 
period, as a similar result in Table 4 would imply. Rather, it estimates the 
magnitude the inefficiency regardless of direction.  
This finding means abnormal risk-adjusted returns exist not only in 
response to individual hurricanes, but also hurricanes as a group13. This finding is 
important, as an investor with this knowledge does not need to know the 
characteristics of a hurricane or the macro environment that cause inefficiency in 
individual hurricanes to make profit, he or she only needs to execute their strategy 
over all hurricanes, as the overall market response to hurricanes is inefficient. 
 
ii. Hypothesis 2: 
 
 
 My second testable hypothesis is that the market’s degree of efficiency in 
response to hurricanes is constant. While rejecting my first null hypothesis led to 
the conclusion that the market responds inefficiently to hurricanes in my sample 
as a group and that the AMH assumptions govern market behavior in that respect, 
determining whether market efficiency is constant brings us a step closer to 
understanding the drivers of market efficiency surrounding hurricanes. 
I regress my squared measure of cumulative abnormal return by both 
storm order and year of storm, simply trying to determine if: 
    !" 
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 While this is true over our sample period, past performance does not indicate future results, and 
a similar trading strategy that may produce abnormal risk-adjusted returns in one period is not 
guaranteed to in another period. 
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Or if: 
  #" 
 The results of my tests of this hypothesis are found in Table 6. Attempting 
to explain cumulative abnormal return by storm order within year and season as 
seen in regressions (i) and (ii) yields results that are not statistically significant 
enough to reject the null that the market’s degree of efficiency in response to 
hurricanes is constant.  
 A limitation of this study that these results highlight is the extent to which 
the low number of observations limits not only the ability to make statistically 
significant claims but also its exposure to random variation when attempting to 
isolate drivers of variability in market efficiency. While these problems were not 
present in hypothesis 1 when looking at the hurricanes as a group, they make 
attempts to test the hurricanes against one another an ineffective endeavor. This 
fact, coupled with the low number of hurricanes that occur from year to year and 
even over spans of years, means it may be decades before there is enough storm 
data to accurately measure the constancy of market efficiency surrounding 
hurricanes. This thought will be expanded in the concluding remarks of the paper.  
 
 iv. Robustness 
 
 Another way of thinking about market efficiency and hurricanes is 
examining the reactions by company across hurricanes instead of estimating an 
inefficiency coefficient for each hurricane. While the inefficiency of the entire 
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market response to hurricanes is the most valid way to explore my hypotheses, if 
companies themselves do not respond to hurricanes in a statistically significant 
manner over time the abnormal risk-adjusted returns from the inefficiency created 
by hurricanes cannot be realized by employing a trading strategy on a single 
company, an initial motivation of the paper. In addition, if companies themselves 
to not respond inefficiently over time it is likely that the inefficiency measured 
when I rejected the null hypothesis that the U.S. stock market reacts inefficiently 
to hurricanes was due to random chance in due to noise in the data showing 
statistical significance when observed by hurricane across companies. 
 Market response to hurricanes could be inefficient in a statistically 
significant way without company response across hurricanes over time being 
statistically significant. Consider the hypothetical case where the companies in 
my sample react to hurricanes randomly in terms of efficiency with a true mean 
inefficiency of 0. If enough companies react in the same direction in a random 
fashion to a particular hurricane, the event study methodology will detect 
statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns over the event window for 
that hurricane across companies. If these companies truly behave randomly, it is 
unlikely that these random efficiency measurements detected by the event study 
process will be strong enough in either direction to reject the null that any of my 
firms react efficiently to hurricanes on an individual basis. Admittedly, in a very 
improbable case both of these events could happen and statistical significance 
could possibly be detected by random chance when testing my results both 
vertically by hurricane and horizontally across hurricanes. Yet the improbability 
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of this scenario lends robustness to my results in the case of detected statistical 
significance in both directions. 
 The results of this bootstrapped estimation of cumulative abnormal return 
for each company across hurricanes can be seen in Table 7. American Financial 
Group, Harleysville Group, Inc., and The Hanover Insurance Group, Inc. all show 
statistically significant inefficient reactions across hurricanes. When testing for 
joint significance across all companies, I again use a bootstrapped estimation of 
the squared term of each individual company’s inefficiency measure. These 
results can be seen in Table 8, and I detect statistically significant inefficiency in 
my sample of companies across hurricanes. As previously stated, this finding adds 
robustness to my main results, and serves as validation that the inefficiency 
detected in my event studies exists.  
 The discrepancy between the estimated inefficiency when testing for joint 
significance using the method in my main results and the method outlined above 
highlights the random noise that exists in market data. This can be seen in the 
difference between estimates in Table 5 and Table 8. Without noise, the estimated 
inefficiency coefficient should be the same when looking jointly across 
companies or jointly across hurricanes, yet this is not the case. This small 
discrepancy, however, is not important to the pursuit of the paper, while the 
statistically significant coefficient of inefficiency that exists regardless of how it 
is tested is of great importance. If anything, the presence of no noise in the data 
would be more troubling to the study because of the realities of studying real-
world market data and the noise that inevitably results. 
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 An additional robustness consideration the study makes is the removal of 
Hurricane Rita from the sample and re-estimating the inefficiency coefficient 
across hurricanes. The inefficiency generated by Hurricane Rita is notably larger 
than that generated by other hurricanes, potentially large enough to generate 
statistical significance on its own as a part of the sample. The results of this rerun 
estimation can be seen in Table 9. The removal of Hurricane Rita does not impact 
the statistical significance of the inefficiency coefficient, lending further 
robustness to the main results of the paper. 
 Table 10 shows the results of cross-hurricane efficiency measurements 
using alternative post-landfall event windows. Each of these event studies uses the 
same methodology as previously outlined, and statistically significant inefficient 
reactions in 3 of these 4 windows show that the inefficiency detected in the 
window used for my main results is not a coincidence.  
 As a final robustness consideration, I test my first hypothesis without 
bootstrapping to examine whether or not the bootstrap methodology is creating 
false statistical significance. This result is seen in Table 11, and the statistically 
significant inefficient reaction shows that the bootstrap methodology does not 
impact my estimation. The coefficient estimates are the same in Table 5 and Table 
11, as they should be because the bootstrap methodology only impacts the 
accuracy of the standard error measurement. Bootstrapping my main results is 
necessary because of the fact that estimates of individual hurricane efficiency are 
a product of my event study methodology (and therefore not exact). Table 11 
shows that this bootstrapping process does not impact the statistical significance 
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of these results. Table 12 shows my manual calculation of a 95% confidence 
interval, which I derive using my entire bootstrapped sample of estimates and 
dropping the highest and lowest 2.5%. This process further demonstrates the 
robustness of my statistical significance as zero is not within the interval. 
 
VI. Discussion 
 
 With statistically significant inefficiency detected in price movements of 
my hurricane-exposed property and casualty insurers, I now discuss the real-
world trading application of this information. As previously stated, new ways of 
thinking about market efficiency are motivated by opportunities that exist for risk-
adjusted abnormal returns. With this in mind, I now explore trading strategies that 
generate abnormal risk-adjusted returns in the face of inefficient market response 
to hurricanes. A caveat of this discussion is the fact that my analysis of these 
strategies is only theoretical, no backtesting of their effectiveness has been done. 
A further consideration is that even in the presence of backtested success, past 
performance does not indicate future success. 
 
 i. Trading Strategies with Abnormal Risk-Adjusted Returns 
 
 A trading strategy based on the news of a pending hurricane, given the 
results of my event studies, will be successful in the immediate post-hurricane 
period if it is neutral and bullish on volatility. It is important to note that these 
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characteristics describe the goals of options strategies, and simple buy/sell 
strategies on securities themselves are ineffective in this scenario.  
 I will cover options strategies briefly. An option is the right to buy or sell a 
security at a given price (strike price) within a specified time. The right to buy is 
known as a call option, and the right to sell is known as a put option. Both calls 
and puts can be bought and sold. Between these four options (buying calls, selling 
calls, buying puts, and selling puts), complicated strategies can be executed that 
limit risk and/or reward for the right to be successful in specific scenarios. The 
scenario we are targeting with our options play is a neutral move (profitable in 
either direction) with increased volatility in the future. Any such strategy will 
generate abnormal risk-adjusted returns in the post-hurricane period, due to the 
statistically significant inefficient market reaction to such events. 
 Four common options strategies fit this goal. They include the long 
straddle, long strangle, short condor, and short butterfly. While these strategies 
differ in subtle ways, the foundation of all of them is neutrally directed increase in 
volatility in the future. These strategies are engineered using a combination of 
buying and selling calls and puts at varying strike prices depending on where the 
underlying security currently trades. Each of these strategies is successful pending 
a large enough move in the share price of the underlying company in either 
direction. 
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VII. Conclusion 
 
 In this study, I examine market efficiency surrounding hurricanes. 
Inefficient market response to any event leads to windows in which abnormal 
risk-adjusted returns exist in equity markets. These abnormal risk-adjusted returns 
motivate the academic community to think of market efficiency in new ways. A 
recent development in the literature is study of the impact of natural disasters on 
market efficiency, as opposed to the more common focus on market efficiency 
during man-made crises such as financial collapses. 
 I conduct 192 event studies on 16 hurricane-exposed property and casualty 
insurers for all 12 hurricanes that made landfall in the United States during the 
2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons. The results of all of these studies, as well as 
event window diagrams for each hurricane with bootstrap-estimated company 
results can be seen in Tables A.1 through A.12 and Figures A.1 through A.12. I 
use the results of these event studies to test 2 hypotheses derived from 
discrepancies between the Efficient Market Hypothesis (Fama, 1970) and the 
Adaptive Markets Hypothesis (Lo, 2004). The period of inefficiency post-event 
for investors to sort meaningful information from noise that Lo incorporates into 
his AMH forms the basis for the first hypothesis I test: that the U.S. stock market 
reacts to hurricanes efficiently as defined by the EMH, which does not allow for 
this period of inefficiency. Additionally, the static players in Fama’s EMH do not 
change their behavior over time, while Lo’s AMH investors are constantly 
changing their investment strategies. This distinction leads to my second testable 
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hypothesis: that the degree to which the U.S. stock market efficiently responds to 
hurricanes is constant. 
 Using bootstrapped estimations of the coefficient of cumulative abnormal 
returns generated in the post-hurricane period, I generate a measure of 
inefficiency for each hurricane that incorporates the reactions of all companies in 
the event window. I test this statistic for significance using these bootstrapped 
standard errors, and these results can be seen in Table 4.  
 I explore my first hypothesis using these inefficiency measurements. To 
generate a measure of inefficiency that is neutral of positivity and negativity, I 
square each hurricane’s inefficiency coefficient, and use another bootstrapped 
estimation across these all hurricanes to test whether or not they are jointly 
inefficient. The results of this process can be seen in Table 5, and I ultimately am 
able to conclude that hurricanes create statistically significant inefficiency in the 
U.S. stock market, and that Lo’s AMH assumptions more accurately govern the 
behavior of players in this market than the assumptions of Fama’s EMH, at least 
in terms of the existence of a post-landfall window inefficiency while investors 
sort fundamental information from inefficient noise. 
 I test my second hypothesis using the order of hurricane within season and 
the year in which the hurricane falls to attempt to isolate whether inefficiency is 
constant. As previously discussed, the low observation count negatively impacts 
this aspect of the study to detect statistical significance, and also leaves it subject 
to a plethora of random factors. Tests of the first hypothesis did not have this 
issue, as companies and hurricanes were tested jointly. Yet treating storms in an 
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individual manner and attempting to discern between them makes tests with so 
few observations ineffective. It should also be noted that due to the relative 
scarcity of hurricane data because of the rarity of the storms, it might be some 
time before enough data exists to run a test of this type. I ultimately do not have 
enough evidence to reject the hypothesis that the U.S. stock market reacts to 
hurricanes at a constant degree of inefficiency. 
 For robustness, I first test inefficiency across hurricanes for each of the 
companies in my sample, and then estimate the overall inefficiency across 
companies using the same bootstrapped estimation method. Even when tested this 
way, companies responded to hurricanes in a jointly inefficient way, aiding in 
establishing that the results that rejected hypothesis 1 were not the result of 
random noise. Furthermore, I remove Hurricane Rita from my sample and once 
again find that hurricanes treated jointly react to hurricanes inefficiently. 
 True to the central motivation of the paper, I briefly note trading strategies 
that will generate abnormal risk-adjusted returns in the post-hurricane period 
according to the results of my study. While simple buy/sell strategies will not be 
effective, complicated options strategies that are direction neutral and bullish on 
future volatility will be profitable. 
 The existence of statistically significant inefficiency across hurricanes is 
an exciting conclusion of the paper, yet one question remains. What drives this 
inefficiency? According to the AMH, which I conclude governs market reaction 
across hurricanes in the immediate post-hurricane period, it is ultimately the 
players in a given market and their level of competition that determine their level 
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of efficiency as a group (Lo, 2004). The validity of this thought remains to be 
seen in the context of market response to hurricanes. Any further findings in this 
regard only open the door to more opportunities for abnormal risk-adjusted 
returns, and as mentioned from the start, these profit opportunities serve as 
perpetual motivation to find pockets of inefficiency in markets wherever they 
exist, be it surrounding earnings announcement, mergers and acquisitions, or in 
the case of this study: hurricanes. 
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IX.  Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: 
Property and Casualty Insurers 
Company Ticker 
American Financial Group AFG 
American International Group, Inc. AIG 
Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. BRK.A 
Chubb Corporation CB 
Hanover Insurance Group, Inc. THG 
Harleysville Group, Inc. HGIC 
Markel Corporation MKL 
The Navigators Group, Inc. NAVG 
RLI Corporation RLI 
W.R. Berkley Corporation WRB 
Travelers Companies, Inc. TRV 
Cna Financial Corporation CAN 
Hartford Financial Services HIG 
State Auto Financial STFC 
Cincinnati Financial Corporation CINF 
Old Republic International Corporation ORI 
 
 
Table 2: 
Hurricanes 
Name Landfall Date Peak Category* U.S. Landfall Category* 
Alex August 3, 2004 3 2 
Charley August 13, 2004 4 4 
Gaston August 29, 2004 1 1 
Frances September 5, 2004 4 2 
Ivan September 16, 2004 5 3 
Jeanne September 25, 2004 3 3 
Cindy July 5, 2005 1 1 
Dennis July 10, 2005 4 3 
Katrina August 29, 2005 5 3 
Ophelia September 14, 2005 1 1 
Rita September 23, 2005 5 3 
Wilma October 24, 2005 5 3 
*As defined by the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale 
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Table 3: 
 
Summary Statistics: Event Study Results by Hurricane 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Cumulative Abnormal Return 12 0.06 0.88 -1.03 2.08 
CAR Squared 12 0.72 1.21 0.01 4.32 
 
 
Table 4: 
 
Bootstrapped* Estimations of Cumulative Abnormal Return Across 
All Companies by Hurricane 
2004 2005 
Hurricane CAR Estimate Hurricane CAR Estimate 
Alex -0.38% Cindy 0.11% 
(0.52) (0.28) 
Charley -0.55% Dennis -0.16% 
(0.23)** (0.47) 
Gaston -0.44% Katrina -1.03% 
(0.43) (0.52)** 
Frances 0.63% Ophelia 0.38% 
(0.44) (0.32) 
Ivan -0.29% Rita 2.08% 
(0.29) (1.05)** 
Jeanne -0.77% Wilma 1.15% 
  (0.48)   (0.81) 
*Standard errors bootstrapped using 1,000 repetitions      
**Significant at the 5% level 
 
 
Table 5: 
 
Bootstrapped* Estimation of Market Reaction 
Efficiency to Hurricanes During the 2004 and 2005 
Seasons 
Estimate 
Bootstrapped 
Standard Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
0.72% 0.35** (0.06%,1.37%) 
*Standard errors bootstrapped using 1,000 repetitions                                        
**Significant at the 5% level 
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Table 6: 
 
Bootstrapped Estimation of Change in 
Hurricane Efficiency 
Variable (i) (ii) 
Order 0.29 
(0.19) 
Season 0.86 
    (0.65) 
R-Squared 0.18 0.14 
Observations 12 12 
Replications 1,000 1,000 
 
 
 
Table 7: 
 
Bootstrapped* Estimations of Cumulative Abnormal Return by 
Company Across Hurricanes 
Company CAR Estimate Company CAR Estimate 
AFG -0.77% MKL -0.21% 
(0.34)** (0.34) 
AIG 0.40% NAVG 0.52% 
(0.29) (1.66) 
BRK.A -0.23% ORI 0.20% 
(0.36) (0.19) 
CB 0.41% RLI 0.68% 
(0.57) (0.35) 
CINF -0.18% STFC 0.30% 
(0.26) (0.50) 
CNA -0.55% THG -1.58% 
(0.53) (0.51)** 
HGIC 1.43% TRV 0.10% 
(0.58)** (0.78) 
HIG -0.30% WRB 0.74% 
  (0.51)   (0.93) 
*Standard errors bootstrapped using 1,000 repetitions      
**Significant at the 5% level 
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Table 8: 
 
Bootstrapped* Estimation of Company-Specific 
Inefficiency Across Hurricanes During the 2004 and 
2005 Seasons 
Estimate Bootstrapped Standard Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
0.46% 0.18** (0.11%,0.81%) 
*Standard errors bootstrapped using 1,000 repetitions                                        
**Significant at the 5% level 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: 
Bootstrapped* Estimation of Market Reaction 
Efficiency to Hurricanes During the 2004 and 2005 
Seasons Without Hurricane Rita 
Estimate 
Bootstrapped 
Standard Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
0.39% 0.13** (0.14%,0.64%) 
*Standard errors bootstrapped using 1,000 repetitions                                        
**Significant at the 5% level 
 
 
 
Table 10: 
 
Bootstrapped Estimation of Market Reaction Efficiency to Hurricanes: Alternate 
Post-Landfall Windows 
  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Estimate 1.04% 1.28% 0.58% 0.62% 
  (0.35)** (0.66) (0.17)** (0.18)** 
*Window (i): four trading days including landfall, Window (ii): five trading days 
including landfall, Window (iii): three trading days starting day after landfall, 
Window (iv): four trading days starting day after landfall                                                         
**Significant at the 5% level 
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Table 11: 
 
Non-Bootstrapped Estimation of Market Reaction 
Efficiency to Hurricanes During the 2004 and 
2005 Seasons 
Estimate Standard Error 95% Confidence Interval 
0.72% 0.34** (0.01%,1.52%) 
*Standard errors bootstrapped using 1,000 
repetitions                                                     
**Significant at the 5% level 
 
 
 
Table 12: 
 
Manual Confidence Interval* of 
Bootstrapped Main Results 
(0.36,1.65) 
*95% Confidence Interval 
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X. Appendix 
 
 
Table A.1: 
 
Event Study Results* for Hurricane Alex 
Company Cumulative Abnormal Return Company Cumulative Abnormal Return 
AFG -0.07% MKL 0.62% 
AIG 1.04% NAVG -6.44% 
BRK.A -1.19% ORI -0.53% 
CB -1.36% RLI 1.14% 
CINF 1.73% STFC 0.44% 
CNA -0.47% THG -1.63% 
HGIC 2.52% TRV -3.05% 
HIG 0.60% WRB 0.59% 
*Using 2003 hurricane season as estimation window (June 1st - November 30th) and an 
event window of landfall date + 2 trading days 
 
 
 
 
Table A.2: 
 
Event Study Results* for Hurricane Charley 
Company Cumulative Abnormal Return Company Cumulative Abnormal Return 
AFG -1.54% MKL -0.97% 
AIG 0.36% NAVG 0.03% 
BRK.A 0.82% ORI -0.11% 
CB -0.91% RLI -1.56% 
CINF -1.42% STFC -0.45% 
CNA -1.67% THG -0.96% 
HGIC -0.68% TRV 1.66% 
HIG -1.60% WRB 0.07% 
*Using 2003 hurricane season as estimation window (June 1st - November 30th) and an 
event window of landfall date + 2 trading days 
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Table A.3: 
 
 
Event Study Results* for Hurricane Gaston 
Company Cumulative Abnormal Return Company Cumulative Abnormal Return 
AFG -3.25% MKL -0.06% 
AIG 0.99% NAVG -3.08% 
BRK.A 0.42% ORI -0.34% 
CB -0.36% RLI 0.59% 
CINF 0.14% STFC -0.91% 
CNA -4.64% THG 0.15% 
HGIC 1.85% TRV 1.35% 
HIG 0.11% WRB 0.09% 
*Using 2003 hurricane season as estimation window (June 1st - November 30th) and an 
event window of landfall date + 2 trading days 
 
 
 
Table A.4: 
 
 
Event Study Results* for Hurricane Frances 
Company Cumulative Abnormal Return Company Cumulative Abnormal Return 
AFG 0.61% MKL 2.60% 
AIG 1.34% NAVG -0.23% 
BRK.A 0.32% ORI 0.46% 
CB 1.02% RLI 0.99% 
CINF -0.23% STFC -1.00% 
CNA -1.89% THG -4.29% 
HGIC 3.68% TRV -0.06% 
HIG 2.19% WRB 0.82% 
*Using 2003 hurricane season as estimation window (June 1st - November 30th) and an 
event window of landfall date + 2 trading days 
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Table A.5: 
 
 
Event Study Results* for Hurricane Ivan 
Company Cumulative Abnormal Return Company Cumulative Abnormal Return 
AFG -0.61% MKL 0.13% 
AIG 0.03% NAVG -2.92% 
BRK.A -0.35% ORI 0.63% 
CB 0.60% RLI -0.27% 
CINF 0.53% STFC -1.46% 
CNA -2.51% THG -0.52% 
HGIC -0.29% TRV 1.21% 
HIG 1.31% WRB -0.11% 
*Using 2003 hurricane season as estimation window (June 1st - November 30th) and an 
event window of landfall date + 2 trading days 
 
 
 
 
Table A.6: 
 
 
Event Study Results* for Hurricane Jeanne 
Company Cumulative Abnormal Return Company Cumulative Abnormal Return 
AFG -0.84% MKL 0.39% 
AIG -1.31% NAVG -1.74% 
BRK.A -1.38% ORI 0.94% 
CB -0.96% RLI 0.73% 
CINF -0.11% STFC -0.98% 
CNA 0.60% THG -0.66% 
HGIC 3.78% TRV -4.86% 
HIG -3.27% WRB -2.70% 
*Using 2003 hurricane season as estimation window (June 1st - November 30th) and an 
event window of landfall date + 2 trading days 
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Table A.7: 
 
 
Event Study Results* for Hurricane Cindy 
Company Cumulative Abnormal Return Company Cumulative Abnormal Return 
AFG -0.45% MKL -0.39% 
AIG 0.99% NAVG 0.23% 
BRK.A 1.25% ORI -0.46% 
CB 0.23% RLI 1.31% 
CINF -0.51% STFC -2.19% 
CNA 1.59% THG -0.94% 
HGIC -1.07% TRV 1.90% 
HIG 0.85% WRB -0.55% 
*Using 2003 hurricane season as estimation window (June 1st - November 30th) and an 
event window of landfall date + 2 trading days 
 
 
 
 
Table A.8: 
 
 
Event Study Results* for Hurricane Dennis 
Company Cumulative Abnormal Return Company Cumulative Abnormal Return 
AFG -1.81% MKL -2.81% 
AIG -0.02% NAVG 1.46% 
BRK.A -1.48% ORI -0.33% 
CB -0.40% RLI 2.64% 
CINF -1.39% STFC 1.83% 
CNA -0.87% THG -1.19% 
HGIC 4.42% TRV -0.35% 
HIG -2.00% WRB -0.33% 
*Using 2003 hurricane season as estimation window (June 1st - November 30th) and an 
event window of landfall date + 2 trading days 
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Table A.9: 
 
 
 
Event Study Results* for Hurricane Katrina 
Company Cumulative Abnormal Return Company Cumulative Abnormal Return 
AFG -1.07% MKL -0.90% 
AIG -1.10% NAVG -0.63% 
BRK.A -0.70% ORI -0.26% 
CB -1.17% RLI 0.57% 
CINF -1.20% STFC 4.05% 
CNA -0.91% THG -4.67% 
HGIC 2.06% TRV -4.97% 
HIG -3.66% WRB -2.02% 
*Using 2003 hurricane season as estimation window (June 1st - November 30th) and an 
event window of landfall date + 2 trading days 
 
 
 
 
Table A.10: 
 
 
Event Study Results* for Hurricane Ophelia 
Company Cumulative Abnormal Return Company Cumulative Abnormal Return 
AFG -0.15% MKL 0.20% 
AIG 0.06% NAVG -0.85% 
BRK.A -2.59% ORI 1.43% 
CB 1.82% RLI 2.42% 
CINF -0.56% STFC 0.59% 
CNA -0.50% THG -0.55% 
HGIC 0.45% TRV 1.68% 
HIG 0.45% WRB 2.23% 
*Using 2003 hurricane season as estimation window (June 1st - November 30th) and an 
event window of landfall date + 2 trading days 
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Table A.11: 
 
 
Event Study Results* for Hurricane Rita 
Company Cumulative Abnormal Return Company Cumulative Abnormal Return 
AFG -1.61% MKL -0.42% 
AIG 2.42% NAVG** 17.50% 
BRK.A 2.16% ORI 1.11% 
CB 0.39% RLI -1.46% 
CINF 0.91% STFC 1.84% 
CNA 1.71% THG 1.23% 
HGIC 2.28% TRV 4.51% 
HIG 0.59% WRB 0.11% 
*Using 2003 hurricane season as estimation window (June 1st - November 30th) and an 
event window of landfall date + 2 trading days                                                          
**Final Katrina losses calculated at $1.17/share 
 
 
 
Table A.12: 
 
 
 
Event Study Results* for Hurricane Wilma 
Company Cumulative Abnormal Return Company Cumulative Abnormal Return 
AFG 1.52% MKL -0.91% 
AIG -0.03% NAVG 2.89% 
BRK.A -0.07% ORI -0.17% 
CB 6.08% RLI 1.10% 
CINF 0.00% STFC 1.84% 
CNA -0.79% THG -4.88% 
HGIC -1.80% TRV 2.14% 
HIG 0.88% WRB 10.67% 
*Using 2003 hurricane season as estimation window (June 1st - November 30th) and an 
event window of landfall date + 2 trading days 
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